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Decided on September 20, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County
689 E 187th St LLC, PetitionerLandlord,
against
Jacqueline Mathu, RespondentTenant,
and "JOHN DOE" and "JANE DOE", RespondentsUndertenants.

L&T Index No. 302284/21
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Lawrence McCourt, Esq.
Lazarus Karp, LLP
7 Penn Plaza, Suite 720
New York, New York 10001
(646) 2811281
lmccourt@lazkarp.com
Attorneys for Respondent
Susannah R. Kroeber, Esq.
Bronx Legal Services
349 East 149th Street, 10th Floor
Bronx, New York 10451
(718) 9283758
skroeber@lsnyc.org

Diane E. Lutwak, J.
Recitation, as required by CPLR Rule 2219(A), of the papers considered in the review
of Petitioner's Motion to Restore to Calendar and Respondent Jacqueline Mathu's Cross
Motion to Dismiss or Deem Proposed Answer Duly Served and Filed:
Papers NYSCEF Doc #
Petitioner's Notice of Motion 19
Attorney's Affirmation and Agent's Affidavit in Support of Motion 2021
Petitioner's Exhibits AD 2225
Respondent's Notice of CrossMotion/Attorney's Affirmation
in Opposition to Motion and in Support of CrossMotion 28
Respondent's Exhibits AG 2935
Attorney's Affirmation and Agent's Affidavit in Reply and Opposition 3637
Petitioner's Exhibits AB 3839
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a holdover proceeding against a Rent Stabilized tenant based upon alleged
violation of a substantial obligation of the tenancy and unreasonable refusal to provide access
to the landlord to inspect, make repairs and correct violations of the Housing Maintenance
Code (HMC) placed by the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
Development (HPD), in violation of Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) §§ 2524.3(a) and
2524.3(e) and HMC § 272008. The Petition is based on a Notice to Cure dated August 12,
2020 which includes a detailed list of 21 violations HPD found in Respondent's apartment,
seven on February 26, 2020 and fourteen on July 21, 2020. The Notice to Cure lists dates in
March, July and August 2020 when Petitioner tried unsuccessfully to schedule access dates
with Respondent and advises Respondent to effectuate a cure by providing access by
September 11, 2020. The Notice to Cure was followed by a Notice of Termination dated
February 12, 2021 asserting that Respondent failed to cure by September 11, 2020 and
thereafter failed to provide access on December 14, 2020, a date when Petitioner again
attempted access. The Petition seeks a final judgment of possession, issuance of a warrant of
eviction, fair value of use and occupancy of the premises and a money judgment for rent
arrears, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements.
The Petition was filed on April 7, 2021 and, initially, placed on the Court's Holdover
Administrative Calendar pursuant to thenexisting COVID19 pandemic protocols.
Thereafter, the case was stayed first because Respondent filed a "Hardship Declaration"
under the COVID19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020

("CEEFPA") and then because Respondent filed an application for the Emergency Rent
Assistance Program ("ERAP"). Now before the Court is Petitioner's motion seeking to
calendar the case for conference and, if the case does not settle, for trial, and Respondent's
crossmotion to dismiss or, alternatively, for leave to file an Answer and to deem her
proposed Answer duly served and filed. The motions were argued and marked submitted on
September 12, 2022.
PETITIONER'S MOTION
In its agent's affidavit in support of its motion Petitioner asserts that the case should be
calendared and permitted to proceed to trial if not settled because Respondent's ERAP
application was denied and Respondent has still failed to provide Petitioner with access to
correct the 54 open HMC violations in her apartment placed by HPD. Petitioner also points
out that Respondent has not filed an Answer to the Petition.
RESPONDENT'S OPPOSITION AND CROSSMOTION
Respondent, by counsel, argues that Petitioner's motion should be denied and
Respondent's crossmotion to dismiss should be granted because it was not unreasonable for
her to refuse to provide access during the height of the COVID19 pandemic, citing to MHM
Sponsors Co v Hirsch (15 Misc 3d 641, 831 NYS2d 315 [Civ Ct NY Co 2007]), and the
access dates listed in Petitioner's predicate notices all fell during the State of Emergency
declared by Executive Order of the Governor of New York State. Respondent also argues
that, in any event, there is evidence — including "evidence submitted by Petitioner",
Respondent's Attorney's [*2]Affirmation at ¶ 27, and an email exchange between counsel in
January 2022 provided by Respondent's counsel  that Respondent both did provide access
and further offered to provide additional access.
Alternatively, Respondent asks the Court for leave to interpose an Answer, arguing that
it is timely under RPAPL § 743, which permits an answer in a holdover proceeding to be
interposed "at the time the petition is to be heard", and pointing out that the case was stayed
due to pandemicrelated issues and has not yet been heard. Further, if the Court finds the
Answer to be late, Respondent argues that the Court should exercise its discretion to deem it
duly served and filed as the delay was not willful, there is no prejudice to Petitioner and
strong public policy favors resolution of cases on their merits. Respondent's proposed
Answer, in addition to addressing each paragraph of the Petition (admits/denies/lacks
information or knowledge), is comprised of two defenses (defective notice of termination and

failure to provide adequate opportunity to cure), two affirmative defenses (cure and request
for an opportunity to cure) and one counterclaim (attorneys' fees).
PETITIONER'S REPLY AND OPPOSITION
On reply, Petitioner points out that Respondent has not opposed its motion or supported
her crossmotion with an affidavit by anyone with personal knowledge of the facts.
Petitioner's agent explains in his reply affidavit that Respondent never denied access because
of COVID19 concerns but "denied access when either the superintendent appeared or when
my contractors would not work the way she directed" and that the access Respondent did
provide was not meaningful "due to the high state of clutter in the premises which prevents
petitioner from performing the necessary work to remedy the violations of record."
Petitioner's agent refutes the factual allegations in Respondent's attorney's affirmation
regarding efforts to schedule access that were made via an email exchange.
Petitioner opposes Respondent's crossmotion for leave to file an Answer, arguing there
is no controlling authority "that gives respondent a wholesale right to file an answer at any
time prior to the date of the adjournment". Petitioner further argues that Respondent's
proposed defense of "cure" is undermined by the email exchange between counsel included
as an exhibit to Respondent's crossmotion; her counterclaim for legal fees is barred by the
Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA); and Respondent's proposed
Answer should be rejected because it is not verified, citing to CPLR § 3020.
DISCUSSION
The Court will first address Respondent's crossmotion to dismiss, as if it is granted then
Petitioner's motion to calendar the case for settlement conference or trial will be moot. On a
motion to dismiss under CPLR R 3211 the court must afford a liberal construction to the
pleading, Leon v Martinez (84 NY2d 83, 8788, 638 NE2d 511, 513, 614 NYS2d 972, 974
[1984]), and "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit
of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit
within any cognizable legal theory." Id. "Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its
allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss." EBC I, Inc v
Goldman Sachs & Co (5 NY3d 11, 19, 832 NE2d 26, 31, 799 NYS2d 170, 175 [2005]); TIAA
Global Invs, LLC v One Astoria Sq LLC (127 AD3d 75, 85, 7 NYS3d 1 [1st Dep't 2015]).
Respondent's argument is essentially that this case should be dismissed as Petitioner can

state no claim of an unreasonable refusal to provide access for repairs under RSC § 2524.3(e)
where such refusal took place between March 7, 2020 and June 24, 2021, the period covered
by [*3]the Governor's Executive Order declaring a State of Emergency due to the COVID19
pandemic. This argument is overly broad and rejected. Petitioner's Notice to Cure,
incorporated by reference in the Petition, includes a detailed list of 21 violations, 14 of which
 including four categorized as Class C/"immediately hazardous" and nine as Class B/
"hazardous"[FN1] — were placed by HPD during the COVID19 State of Emergency, on July
21, 2020, following either an inspection by HPD of Respondent's apartment or Respondent
simply calling in complaints to HPD. Whether it was reasonable or unreasonable for
Respondent to then refuse to provide access to the landlord to repair the conditions she had
complained to HPD about is a question of fact that cannot be determined at this stage of the
litigation, not a matter of law warranting dismissal of the Petition for failure to state a cause
of action. What would have been unreasonable — and a violation of the Housing
Maintenance Code — is if Petitioner had failed to attempt to correct the violations HPD
placed, citing to the pandemic as a categorical reason for its refusal to make repairs.
Also unavailing is Respondent's argument that "The evidence submitted by Petitioner
that constitutes their prima facie case makes clear that Respondent has, in fact, provided
access for at least some necessary repairs." Respondent's Attorney's Affirmation at ¶ 27.
Respondent points to one of three letters from Petitioner to Respondent attached to the Notice
to Cure in which "Petitioner admits that 'as scheduled with HPD, you provided access to have
the breakers in your apartment switched back on.'" Id. at ¶ 28. That Respondent may have
provided access for one limited purpose does not undermine and negate the other factual
allegations of the Petition, and the conflicting assertions by Petitioner's agent and
Respondent's attorney as to efforts made to schedule access for repairs in January 2022 only
emphasize the presence of issues of fact warranting a trial on the merits. Petitioner's
opportunity to fully establish its prima facie case is at trial, not the pleading stage, and it
cannot be said that dismissal is warranted on the motion papers as "the essential facts have
been negated beyond substantial question by the affidavits and evidentiary matter submitted".
Blackgold Realty Corp v Milne (119 AD2d 512, 513, 501 NYS2d 44, 46 [1st Dep't 1986]).
The decision cited by Respondent, MHM Sponsors Co v Hirsch (15 Misc 3d 641, 831
NYS2d 315 [Civ Ct NY Co 2007]), also a noaccess holdover, is irrelevant to the question of
whether Petitioner has stated a claim. In MHM Sponsors, at issue was a parquet wood floor
"in a dangerously deteriorated condition". The tenant claimed that she had refused access for
repairs because her health would be adversely affected by the glue used to lay the new floor.

After trial, the court granted the landlord a judgment of possession, finding that the
respondent's belief that she should withhold access under the circumstances presented was
unreasonable, and that "[a]n ordinary prudent individual would accept a potential shortterm
risk to his or her health in order to alleviate a condition that was causing an ongoing and
continuing risk to her health and safety." MHM Sponsors Co v Hirsch (15 Misc 3d at 646,
831 NYS2d at 319). This is necessarily a factladen determination made after trial, not on a
motion to dismiss where the [*4]question is whether a claim has been stated, not whether the
petitioner "can ultimately establish its allegations." EBC I, Inc v Goldman Sachs & Co,
supra.
Having denied Respondent's motion to dismiss, the court now grants Petitioner's motion
to calendar this case for a pretrial settlement conference. Respondent has raised no factual
issues in response to Petitioner's assertion that Respondent's ERAP application was denied
and that, accordingly, the stay of this proceeding imposed by the ERAP Law, L. 2021, c. 56,
Part BB, Subpart A, § 8, as amended by L. 2021, c. 417, Part A, § 4, should be lifted.
Respondent's alternate request for an order deeming her proposed Answer duly served
and filed is also granted. Respondent correctly argues that under RPAPL §743 the answer in a
holdover proceeding is to be asserted or filed "at the time when the petition is to be heard",
and the Petition is only just now being calendared in this Decision and Order to be heard for
the first time. When it was filed, the Notice of Petition did not "specify the time and place of
the hearing" as required by RPAPL § 731(2), or state "that if respondent shall fail at such
time to interpose and establish any defense that he may have, he may be precluded from
asserting such defense or the claim on which it is based in any other proceeding or action,"
id. Rather, pursuant to thenexisting COVID19 pandemic protocols, the Notice of Petition
states that the date on which Respondent "must come" to court was "to be determined". The
information in the Notice of Petition about how to answer the Petition ("tell the judge the
legal reasons that you should be allowed to stay in your home" and "Important! If you don't
tell the Clerk about a defense in your Answer you might not be able to talk about it later in
the case") must be read in light of the fact that the Notice of Petition advised Respondent that
she was not to come to court until "The court will set a date and notify the parties when we
are able to do so."
After the Petition was filed, the Court Clerk's office initially placed this case on the
court's "Holdover Administrative Calendar" and, to date, other than the date for hearing the
pending motion and crossmotion, the case has not been calendared to be heard, first because
of Respondent's filing of a Hardship Declaration pursuant to CEEFPA and then due to

Respondent's filing of an ERAP application. The date on which the court calendared the
pending motions to be heard does not constitute "the time when the petition is to be heard"
under RPAPL § 743.[FN2]
Petitioner argues that the proposed Answer should be rejected as it is not verified by
Respondent. However, as RPAPL § 743 allows a respondent in a holdover proceeding to
answer the petition orally, a fortiori an unverified written answer is also permitted. See Turk
v B Jakobsons & Son (188 Misc203, 66 NYS2d 430 [1st Dep't 1946]); Profile Enters LP v
Sanzo (2005 NY Misc LEXIS 3403, 234 NYLJ 8 ([Civ Ct NY Co 2005]); and compare
Glorius v Siegel (5 Misc 3d 1015[A], 798 NYS2d 709 [Civ Ct NY Co 2004]). As for
Petitioner's argument that Respondent's counterclaim for attorney's fees is barred by HSTPA,
a reference to the 2019 amendments to RPAPL § 702 and RPL § 234, see, e.g., 744 E 215
LLC v Simmonds (65 Misc 3d 1234[A], 119 NYS3d 828 [Civ Ct Bx Ct 2019]); Magnano v
Stewart (71 Misc 3d 1223[A], 145 NYS3d 329 [Justice Ct, Town of Ossining, Westch Co
2021]), it must be noted that the Petition [*5]includes a claim for attorney's fees in the
request for relief. Accordingly, the question of whether the prevailing party in this
proceeding is entitled to attorney's fees will await another day for resolution.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Petitioner's motion is granted to the
extent of restoring the case to the Court's calendar for a pretrial, inperson conference on
October 26, 2022 at 12:00 noon and Respondent's motion is granted to the extent of
deeming her proposed Answer duly served and filed. This constitutes the Decision and Order
of the Court, which is being uploaded on NYSCEF.
_________________________
Diane E. Lutwak, HCJ
Dated: September 20, 2022
Bronx, New York
Footnotes
Footnote 1:A class "A" violation is "nonhazardous" pursuant to N.Y.C. Admin. Code §27
2115(c)(1); a class "B" violation is "hazardous" pursuant to N.Y.C. Admin. Code §272115(c)
(2); and a class "C" violation is "immediately hazardous" pursuant to N.Y.C. Admin. Code
§272115(c)(3). See, e.g., 13 E 9th St LLC v Seelig (63 Misc 3d 1218[A] n 4, 114 NYS3d 817
[Civ Ct NY Co 2019])

Footnote 2:Accordingly, there is no need to address Petitioner's argument that there is no
controlling authority for the proposition that under RPAPL § 743 the time for Respondent to
file an answer is extended by adjournment of the proceeding. But see Picken v Staley (2011
NY Slip Op 33237[U), ~ 4 [Civ Ct NY Co 2011]).
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